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The Fathers as Gatekeepers 
Ancient Irish Laws and the Divorce Referendum of 1995 
by Frances Devlin G h s  by 6 1 per cent of the eligible population), much more was 
at stake than the right to end marriages. Although what 
was voted was conservative by the standards of other 
L'auteure estime que ks hommes de kttres ont sous-estimC countries (the legal right to divorce after five years of 
f'intiritdrsfministespour &S v i m  codes lkgauxde IYrfande, separation), the slim majority represents a major rebuff to 
par aiffeurs libCraux envers &sf.mmes et qu 'ifserait temps de Catholic church control over legislation, and a further 
wedge between civil and ecclesiastical powers (closely 
identified in Ireland both in the constitution and in 
The Brehon laws have been the most liberal in the practice). More importantly, it represents a significant 
western world in relation to divorce and marria~e, challenge to the devaluation ofwomen's autonomy in the 
" - 
and survived operationally until the seventeenth Irish Constitution. 
Ironically, however, opinion ~011s prior to the referen- 
century, though strong4 contested by canon layer s  dum indicated that, in addition to predictable support 
throughout the Dark and Mi& Ages. from older men, both clerical and lay, the no-case was 
produire une Cdition fPministe des fois de f 'Irfande mkdikvale 
et ancienne qui se rapportent au mariage et au divorce. 
For a nation which has in the past two centuries sought to 
define itself by recourse to the ancient past, symbol- 
analysts/manipulators in Ireland have acted uncharacteris- 
tically in failing to claim what is a remarkable fragment of 
its ancient heritage, its dark ages pre-Christian marriage 
laws. The Brehon laws appear to have been the most liberal 
in the western world in relation to divorce and marriage, 
and survived operationally until the seventeenth century, 
though strongly contested (and influenced) by the canon 
lawyers throughout the Dark and Middle Ages. 
The failure to claim this law-tract heritage is in part 
testimony to the enduring power of the Roman Catholic 
Irish church, its policies on family life, and the principles 
enshrinedinArticle41 (Chapter 12, Part 11) ofEamonn de 
Valera's constitution of 1937,' but also, and this is less well 
attested, to the zeal of the academic gatekeepers, the 
linguists and historians (mainly but not exclusively male), 
who have implied that the laws' importance to women has 
been "exaggerated" (Kelly 68; see also 0 Corrdin). Their 
deflections and the national avoidance of this intriguing 
fragment of history are, I believe, a matter of considerable 
importance to women. It is the intention of this article to 
enter this "no-go" arca ofIrish cultuie, and to askquestions 
about why feminists2 have not been more active in re- 
claiming this history and confronting the academic and 
clerical gatekeepers. 
Ireland in 1995 was the last remaining western democ- 
racy to disallow divorce. An earlier referendum to allow 
divorce had been resoundingly defeated in 1986 by two- 
thirds of the electorate. When on 24 November 1995, the 
Divorce Referendum was carried by the narrowest of 
margins (less than half of one per cent of all the votes cast 
supported by more women than men, who apparently 
feared that lifting the ban would bring rewards for adul- 
terous husbands, impoverish women and children, make 
them dependent on welfare (which would result in higher 
taxation), and make it possible for women to be ejected 
from their homes involuntarily. Similar arguments were 
mounted by conservatives when the first of the modern 
divorce laws was enacted in England in 1857. In Ireland 
in the 1990s, as in England in the 1850s, "the dangerous 
sex was not female but male" (Stone 384), and conserva- 
tive defence of the status quo focussed on how to protect 
women from unregulated adultery, and from alleged male 
predilections for sexual novelty and a preference for serial 
polygamy. These social ills were assumed to be the inevi- 
table outcomes of a view of male sexuality which had been 
naturalized, the belief that men had more intense libidi- 
nous drives than women. Paternalistic materialists also 
urged that legislation based on the religious views of the 
indissolubility of marriage constituted a protection of 
standard of living for women and their dependent chil- 
dren. Stone notes that even those who supported the nine- 
teenth-centuryreforms, upper-middle-class women, were 
often doing so not for feminist reasons but were more con- 
cerned about protecting their propertyas wives and achiev- 
ing custody rights than with equity issues, curiously both 
matters which the ancient laws address in equitable terms. 
An index of how marginalized Ireland has been within 
western history and philosophy of ideas by the double 
colonialization (the Church from the fifth century on- 
wards and English and Scots settlers from the end of the 
sixteenth century) is that the general histories of divorce 
and marriage laws which exist (see Corbett; Thomas; 
Brundage; Ingram; Phillips; Shanley; Stone) deal with 
antecedent Jewish, or Roman law, or make passing refer- 
ences to ancient Mesopotamian law tracts (all of which 
constitute entrenched misogynistic legal systems), but are 
silent on ancient Irish law which was recorded after the 
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advent ofChristianity but which encodes a civil law which 
is often liberal and at odds with the teachings of patristic 
scholars on marriage. The codes were practised until the 
twelfth century (MacCurtain and 0 Corriin), and ac- 
tively glossed until as late as the seventeenth century 
(Kelly). These legal tracts, then, have remained securely in 
the hands of Irish language and history scholars, and 
antiquarians. 
In the discussions leading up to the Divorce Referen- 
dum, I was surprised to find no references whatever to the 
Old and Middle Irish law-texts. My introduction to this 
subject came in the form ofa modest populist text, Power's 
A woman had the power to initiate divorce on a variety 
of groundc zythe husband faih to support her, or has 
tricked her into marriage by sorcery, or $he plysically 
assaults her in such a way as to cause a b h i s h ;  ifhe 
becomes so fat he cannot engage in intercourse. 
Sex andMarriage in Ancient Irehnd. He  expressed puzzle- 
ment, with which I fully concur, that although there is a 
body of data on the subject of sex and marriage between 
the fifth century when Christianity reached Ireland until 
the arrival of the Normans in the twelfth century, that the 
time for a modest monograph is "long overdue." He 
assumed that the public reticence about sex and embodi- 
ment was due not only to the influence of the Church but 
to the economics of late marriages which have been 
traditional in Ireland, and to powerful collective codes of 
silence in relation to "sex-talk" (5-6). While Power's 
anatomization of his own culture is doubtless cogent, 
there are other political agendas being served by the silence 
to which he alludes. 
Power's methodology is simple, even simplistic, and 
vulnerable to the critique ofthe specialist in language (Old 
and Middle Irish) or medieval history (see MacCurtain 
and O'Corriin). In a process which has become more 
familiar in the hands ofnew historicists, he juxtaposes legal 
discourses with literary ones, and allows the one category 
to inform the other. The weakness of this methodology is 
the question of the extent to which both the laws as 
recorded and the myths represent historical realities or are 
merely the academic exercises of a learned class. Further- 
more, Power tends to read the mythic literature in literal- 
minded ways. However, although his book does not 
pretend to be scholarly, he demonstrates a formidable 
acquaintance with the main scholarship. Although mod- 
ern scholars complain of Power's lack of expertise (often 
without naming him), this reader ofboth Power's and the 
scholars' accounts of the laws finds them in substance not 
different, though one would have to note that Power is an 
enthusiast rather than a scholar. What may be more to the 
point is that Power intends to make cultural interventions 
of a liberal, and feminist, kind. 
Although Donncha 0 Corriin does not identify the 
tradition of scholarship with which he engages adversarily 
(see MacCurtain and 0 Corriin), like Daniel Binchy, he 
has in his sights the work of the middle and late nine- 
teenth-century social theorists like J. J. Bachofen (Das 
Mutterrecht, 1861), Lewis Henry Morgan (AncientSociety, 
1871) and Frederick Engels (The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property, and the State, 1884) whose work was 
often taken to be proto-feminist before the social Darwin- 
ist assumptions of these theorists were exposed and ques- 
tioned by many marxist-feminist critics, among them, 
feminists such as Martin and Voorhies, Janeway, and 
Rosalind Coward. 0 Corriin asserts magisterially: "Early 
Irish society was patriarchal: the legal and political life was 
governed by men" (1). While this is undoubtedly true (all 
ancient systems of laws have been transmitted via 
patriarchalized scribes; indeed, the Irish law tracts would 
not exist but for the literacy of the Romanized and 
patriarchalized monks who transmitted them), nonethe- 
less, as any casual scrutiny ofancient law texts with gender 
issues at the forefront of one's consciousness will reveal, 
there are degrees of patriarchalization. 
The lifelong power of fathers, thepatriapotestas, and of 
husbands in Roman Law to dissolve marriages (Corbett), 
or the power conferred on husbands in the Codex 
Hammurabi3 to punish wives to the point of death, more 
deeply entrench and institutionalize misogyny than the 
contractual system which Kelly describes as existing in the 
Chin Unamna. Despite being technically deemed with- 
out independent legal capacity except in unusual cases 
(Kelly), a woman (even granting it was only those of a 
certain class4) under this legal code had the power to 
initiate divorce on a variety of grounds: if she is repudiated 
for another woman (and this entitles her to stay in the 
house); if the husband fails to support her, or circulates 
satires about her or is indiscreet about their intimate sexual 
relations, or has tricked her into marriage by sorcery, or if 
he physically assaults her in such a way as to cause a 
blemish; if he is sterile, impotent, practices homosexual- 
ity, or enters holy orders (presumably a post-Christian 
addition), or becomes so fat he cannot engage in inter- 
course (Kelly), or ifeither party becomes mad or incurably 
ill (Mac Curtain and 0 Corriin). A husband may divorce 
his wife for "unfaithfulness, persistent thieving, inducing 
an abortion on herself, bringing shame on his honour, 
smothering her child, and being without milk through 
sickness" (Kelly 75). In addition, there are the eleven 
circumstances on which temporary respite from a mar- 
riage is permissible, including "seek[ing] a child" ifone or 
other partner is infertile (Kelly 75). Once divorced, the 
assets were equitably divided on the basis of what each 
partner brought into the marriage, with division of goods 
and money acquired after marriage being divided in half. 
What is notable in the exegeses that exist on the law 
tracts is the ways in which scholarly lineages emerge: 0 
Corriin follows Binchy's ameliorist (and church-friendly) 
social Darwinism very closely, and it is a narrative which 
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is ideologically based on the notion that the culture which 
generated the laws was an Indo-European one (for which 
read "necessarily patriarchal"). Binchy is committed to 
proving that it is under the influence of Christianity that 
the arneliorization of the place of women occurs: 
In a society of [the Indo-European] kind, women 
have at first no independent legal capacity. They 
cannot inherit property (save in exceptional circum- 
stances), they cannot perform any juristic acts with- 
out the authorization of some man or group of men 
whom the law regards as their guardians. Students of 
Ifindeed it was Roman--or canon-lawyers 
who flected the ameliorization afier the advent 
of Christianity, how are the liberality of the ancient 
Irisb divorce laws to be explained? Th y have no 
precedent in Roman or canon law. 
Roman law are familiar with the perpetua mulierum 
tutekz, and this institution can be paralleled in almost 
every ancient system. In the course of time the status 
of women is progressively raised. They are first ac- 
corded a limited capacity: they can inherit and dispose 
of chattels, some of their contracts may be made 
without authorization, they can bring suits and be 
admitted as witnesses in court proceedings.. . . The 
line of development extends from original total inca- 
pacity to equal or virtually equal capacity with men; 
the concluding stage is that the legal position of the 
female adult is equated to that of the male adult, as 
least as far as private law is concerned. This change is 
always one of the proofs of a highly developed legal 
civilization and depends on the progress of the latter 
rather than on the period of history. (207-8) 
Despite the assurance of the claims made here, Binchy 
later admits that dating the evidence is problematic (texts 
of a sort designated A and those designated B are organized 
thematically rather than historically), except for the glosses 
on both groups (named C) which have to be of a later date. 
T o  a large extent, Binchy's theory is driven by the need to 
use archaic Irish evidence to rehte the notion of a "primi- 
tive matriarchy" h la Bachofen. A hrther argument can be 
advanced to critique his claims: if indeed it was Roman- 
or canon-lawyers who effected the ameliorization after 
the advent of Christianity, how are the liberality of the 
ancient Irish divorce laws to be explained? They have no 
precedent in Roman or canon law. 
0 Corriin uncritically adopts both the premise of an 
Indo-European patriarchal social order and an inversion of 
that in the form of a putative matriarchy which he is at 
pains to dismiss. This leads to much seemingly common 
sense speculation: 
A second type of marriage is known as kznamnasfor 
ferthinchur, a marriage in which the preponderance 
of the marriage goods is provided by the husband. 
This is an older form of marriage, probably less 
common in the late seventh and early eighth centu- 
ries, and must have been the usual type of marital 
arrangement in the older, more patriarchal stage of 
society. 
. . . It would seem, in the very early period, that men 
had verywide rights of divorce whilst women had few 
at all, if any. ( 0  Corriin 3-4) 
0 Cordin briefly pays lip-service to a debate about 
whether the Brehon laws might bear the mark of pre- 
patriarchalized, pre-Celtic thinkers, only to dismiss the 
suggestion as a "matter for debate among scholars" (2).5 
Indeed, the jury is out on this issue, feminist scholarship 
being a relatively new player in the field of Irish language 
studies and medieval history. However, it seems to me that 
the laws and the assumptions made about them by their 
guardians need to be re-read in the light of changing 
paradigms in a wide range of disciplines which have been 
the subject offeminist hermeneutics (Martin andvoorhies; 
Sacks; Sanday; Lerner; Ehrenberg; Condren) since sec- 
ond-wave feminism. 
0 Corriin's and Binchy's binaries,patriarchaUmatriar- 
chalcry out to be deconstructed. It seems possible to me 
that the wrong question is being asked, and that their 
shared social Darwinist premise of patriarchal beginnings 
ameliorated by Christian ideals of gender equity could 
usefully be queried. What is curious in 0 Corrlin's argu- 
ment and rhetoric is theslippage between what 0 Corrdin 
asserts forcibly and his ways of describing the laws which 
he is so keen to style as "patriarchal" but whose "latitudi- 
narianism" he admires. Let us take the following passage 
which occurs strategically early in the article and which 
- .  
presumably is intended to logically govern the argument 
of the essay, rendering that which is offered evidence for 
the following more general contentions: 
Early Irish society was patriarchal: the legal and 
political life was governed by men. This was the case 
amongst the Indo-European communities from which 
most of the early European societies, including the 
Irish, inherited their social systems. In such a patriar- 
chal society, women have no independent legal ca- 
pacity. They can perform no legal act without the 
permission and authorization of a man or a group of 
men. When a woman is young, she is under the 
authority of her father; when married, under the 
authority of her husband; when she is old (and her 
husband is dead), she is under the authority of her 
sons; if she is a spinster or a widow without sons, she 
is under the authority of the head of her family, 
usually her brother. And, ofcourse, ifshe is a nun, she 
is under the authority of the church. (Maccurtain 
and 0 Corriin 1 )  
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Before positing a third position, one not envisaged by 0 
Corriin's binarism (his opposition of matriarchy as some 
' inevitable alternative to patriarchy), we need to examine 
his evidence more closely. It is instructive to see how 0 
Corriin describes one of the most extraordinary features of 
this legal system: 
In the end of the seventh century the normal type of 
marriage is that known as Unamnas comthincuir, the 
marriage in which both parties, the man and the 
woman, jointly contribute to the marriage goods. 
Though these are held in common for the duration of 
the marriage, each of the partners retains the ultimate 
ownership ofwhat he or she contributed. In Irish law 
there is no such thing as common marital property. 
As the law-tracts say, if it is a marriage of joint 
contribution with land and stock and household 
equipment and if the couple come of the same social 
class-the wife is known as "a woman ofjoint domin- 
ion," "a woman of equal lordship." No contract or 
business dealing of one of them is valid or legally 
binding, without the consent of the other.. . . In 
addition, the husband and wife can dissolve each 
other's bad or unprofitable contracts. Apart from 
what they contribute to the joint marriage-fund, the 
husband and the wife may retain their own separate 
personal and private property and the woman's right 
to private property within marriage is clearly set out 
in the laws. As far as this personal property is con- 
cerned, a woman may buy, sell and lend up to a 
certain legal amount. She does not require her hus- 
band's permission and he can make no complaint 
about the matter: ifthe husband uses up or spends any 
of her property, he must restore it if she raises a 
complaint. If they dissolve their marriage, each part- 
ner receives back what each contributed to the mar- 
riage in the first place and the natural increase of their 
property which took place in the course of the mar- 
riage is divided between them according to fixed 
proportions. This division is relatively complex in 
practice but the principles are clear enough. (2) 
What is described here, which substantially concurs 
both with Kelly's more detailed later study and Power's 
popularization, is an account of a legal system which in its 
legal expression (if not in fact) worked exquisitely equita- 
bly, and significantly, contractually, in matters of property 
for both men and women. In this society one imagines that 
accountants, far from having a narrow bean-counting 
function, contributed to the psychic and social well-being 
of the family. The exact reckoning of wealth which is 
- 
attested to here, and the calculations of contributions to 
the marriage could be only advantageous at the point of 
the marriage breakdown. The fact, too, that children were 
routinely fostered in order to cement alliances between 
t2idth (tribe or petty kingdom) meant that another source 
of angst at the point of marital breakdown, custody, did 
not complicate divorce. It is clear, though, that such a 
system was designed to work optimally for that high-class 
group of people who married a person of exactly the same 
social standing, or alternatively, for those lower in the 
social strata whose marriages were within the same rank. 
Differences of rank introduced complications which the 
lawyers relished, and codified. 0 Corriin's evidence, then, 
constitutes a set of discourses which are internally contra- 
dictory and which raise more questions than they answer 
about the uses to which these ancient discourses might be 
put by contemporary feminists. 
Even though Fergus Kelly's scholarly A Guide to Early 
Irish Law meets the needs of the general reader, it is flawed 
by its brotherly side-stepping of feminist agendas and its 
repetition of a view of history and patriarchy which more 
recent feminist scholarship suggests might be due for the 
application of a feminist hermeneutics of suspicion. It is, 
I suggest, time for a new edition of relevant parts of the 
Senchas Mdr and Cdin Ldnamna (the "law of couples") by 
a team which should include a feminist language scholar, 
jurist, and historian. The possibility of reclaiming what 
appears on face value to be the most liberal set of laws on 
marriage and divorce in the western tradition from the 
point of view ofwomen would seem to be an important 
gynocritical and deconstructive project. 
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l~ i t z~a t r i ckand  Dillon argue that, although the language 
ofdebate on divorce in Ireland has tended historically and 
in recent times to be doctrinal, moral, and Church-driven, 
nonetheless social and cultural factors have constituted 
influential impediments to divorce legislation being en- 
acted, notably the actual and symbolic significance of the 
agrarian economy the fact that discourses on individual 
human rights are not highly developed in Ireland, and the 
nexus between nationalism and "traditional" moral val- 
ues. However, mass media commentators on the referen- 
dum seem unanimous that the Church is the most coher- 
ent and organized forum articulating the anti-divorce 
case. 
2 ~ o n d r e n  does give some space to the Brehon Laws, but 
her account is uncritical. 
3 ~ h e  best-known of the ancient Mesopotamian Law 
Codes, dating from about 1729 BCE in the Old Babylonian 
Dynasty. 
*0 Corriin in Maccurtain and 0 Corriin argues that the 
ideal system ofmarriage in which a woman enjoyed "equal 
lordship" (which conferred equitable property rights) 
with her husband was extended in the ninth and tenth 
centuries to women of lower grades, effectively to the 
majority of women. 
5 ~ e l l y  echoes both   inch^ and 0 Corriin and !goes further 
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in claiming that the theory that the Indo-European con- 
querors borrowed customs from their pre-Celtic precur- 
sors has no basis in his view. 
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MARGO HEARNE 
Children of Ireland 
While watching children's soccer in America 
one day 
I noticed all the care and food and stuff pushed 
their way 
At half-time, half an orange, at quarter time, a 
drink 
then more food and fruit juice 
it made me think 
of days I used to hurtle through the fields of 
summer 
chasing hurling balls and footballs 
how I dashed a handball 
against the side of some old barn, 
at noontime, with Jim, had a great swing to my 
arm 
I don't remember, ever, sucking on an orange 
and as for drinking fruit juice? 
Well, we'd cut across the fields for milk 
swinging an old can 
had it filled each day, drinking as we ran 
Were often chased by cattle 
Irish ones are wild 
unlike tame beef bovines 
sleepy-eyed and mild. 
Sometimes, of course, we'd race inside and 
turning on the tap 
would hop from foot to foot while we waiting 
for the cup 
to fill, which, with a gulp was dry 
then we'd flash outside 
drops falling through the air 
to catch the flying, windswept air about us 
and race away 
and never look behind us as we ran. 
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